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SWITZERLAND
I. INTRODUCTION: THE  
“GLOBALIZATION PARADOX” IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE
Switzerland is the most globalized country 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
the economic, political, and social dimen-
sions of globalization.1 Though not being a 
member of the European Union (EU), it is 
closely linked to the latter by a densely knit 
network of bilateral treaties allowing, among 
other things, for free movement of persons.2 
Switzerland furthermore undertakes to abide 
by the judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). The Court has con-
strued the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) as a “living instrument” 
since 1978,3 expanding the ECHR in both 
scope and relevance. At the same time, the 
Swiss Federal Constitution (Fed Const)4 is a 
“popular constitution”.5 All amendments to 
the Constitution are subject to a referendum. 
Such referenda are abundant: In 2018 alone 
Swiss voters were called to the ballot box 
on four different occasions to vote on a to-
tal of eight constitutional draft amendments. 
Switzerland’s constitutional design therefore 
emphasizes popular sovereignty and dem-
ocratic self-governance. Being a small and 
open economy, Switzerland is, at the same 
time, vulnerable to changes in its political, 
economic, and legal environment, having 
only limited political clout to shape world 
markets and the rules and regulations there-
of. It is thus often left with little choice but 
???????????????????????????????????????????6
The inherent tensions between self-gover-
nance, democracy, and economic globaliza-
tion, for which Dani Rodrik coined the term 
“globalization paradox”, are well known.7
Constitutional developments of the past year 
in Switzerland bear witness of this globaliza-
tion paradox.
1 Savina Gygli, Florian Haelg, Niklas Potrafke and Jan-Egbert Sturm, ‘The KOF Globalisation Index Revisited’ 
(2019) Rev Int Organ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
???????????????????????? ????????????
2 See Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss 
Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of persons [21 June 1999] O J L 114, 30/04/2002, 6-72.
3 ECtHR, Tyler v UK, App no 5856/72 (25 April 1978).
4 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
5Johannes Reich, ‘Switzerland: The State of Liberal Democracy’, in Richard Albert et al (eds), ????? ??????
Review of Constitutional Law (2018) 280-285, 280.
6 See the seminal work on the matter by Peter J Katzenstein, ??????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????? (1984) 84, 112-132.
7 See Dani Rodrik, ????????????????????????? (2011) xviii (according to whom the term “globalization para-
???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????
8 The results of all federal popular votes since 1848 can be accessed at the site of the Swiss Federal Chancel-
???????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?
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II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS8 
1. “Self-determination Initiative”: Choosing 
Economic Globalization and International 
Human Rights over “Taking Back Control”
The popular initiative “Swiss Law Instead of 
Foreign Judges (Self-determination Initia-
tive)”, put to a popular vote on 25 November 
2018, illustrates the tensions embraced by the 
globalization paradox in an exemplary man-
ner. The campaign in favor of the Self-de-
termination Initiative stressed the relevance 
of democratic self-governance undeterred by 
international and supranational courts (“for-
eign judges”). Those opposing the constitu-
tional draft amendment, including both the 
Federal Assembly (federal legislative branch) 
and the Federal Council (federal executive 
branch), underscored the importance of the 
ECtHR as an independent judicial authority in 
human rights law and Switzerland’s reliability 
in the international arena.
In its Article 190, the Swiss Federal Consti-
tution commits all courts to adhere to both 
Federal Statutes enacted by Federal Parlia-
ment and international law even in the event 
????????????? ???????? ??????? ????????????? ??
the ECtHR, in turn, monitors Switzerland’s 
compliance with the ECHR unhindered by 
a similar clause limiting the scope of its 
review, the Federal Court (Switzerland’s 
federal supreme court) held that the ECHR 
and other international human rights trea-
ties take precedent over Federal Statutes.9 
In a controversial obiter dictum of 2012, the 
Court went further, stating that the ECHR 
could also “precede norms of the Federal 
Constitution itself”.10 Elevating this line of 
argument to the ratio decidendi of its case 
law would have far-reaching consequences 
given the Constitution’s emphasis on popu-
lar sovereignty and democratic self-gover-
nance. The Federal Constitution allows for 
amending it by way of popular initiatives if 
100,000 citizens, whose signatures must be 
collected within 18 months, back the draft 
amendment put forward by a committee of 7 
to 27 citizens.11 For the ECHR in its evolu-
tive interpretation by the ECtHR to take in-
variable precedent over federal constitution-
al law “would transform the ECHR into an 
additional (supra-)constitutional layer above 
the actual domestic constitution”,12 limiting 
the scope of future constitutional amend-
ments. According to the text of the Constitu-
?????????????????????????????????????????
by the “peremptory norms of international 
law” (ius cogens), such as the prohibition of 
genocide, torture, slavery, or inhuman and 
degrading treatment.13
The aforementioned Article 190, Fed Const, 
however, provides Federal Parliament with 
some margin of appreciation in making its 
???? ??????????? ??? ???? ??? ??????? ???????-
ing obligations deriving from constitutional 
provisions and international law. Enshrined 
in a Federal Statute, such an assessment be-
comes binding on all domestic courts as a 
??????????????? ??????????????????????? ????
regard to the courts, the provision according 
to which the Swiss Federation “shall respect 
international law” (Article 5, Section 4, Fed 
Const)—consciously avoiding the verb “to 
precede”—provides courts with some lee-
way in their assessment of the relation be-
tween domestic and international law in their 
case law. In contrast, the constitutional draft 
amendment put forward by the Self-determi-
nation Initiative sought to establish an abso-
lute and retroactive precedent of the Federal 
Constitution over international law with the 
sole exemption of the aforementioned pe-
remptory norms of international law.
???????? ??????????? ??? ???? ??????????????-
tion Initiative claimed that the constitution-
al amendment would save direct democra-
cy and “re-establish” popular sovereignty 
(or in short, allow the People “to take back 
control”), opponents pointed out that an in-
variable precedent of constitutional over in-
ternational law would seriously jeopardize 
not only Switzerland’s treaty with the EU 
on free movement of persons given the con-
stitutional obligation to restrict the “number 
of residence permits for foreign nationals in 
Switzerland (…) by annual quantitative lim-
its and quotas”14 but also, in view of the so-
called “guillotine clause” declaring a num-
ber of bilateral agreements with the EU to be 
mutually dependent,15 the treaties on areas 
such as technical barriers to trade, research, 
and civil aviation. It was furthermore ques-
tioned whether Switzerland could remain a 
reliable signatory state of the ECHR in view 
of an effective constitutional reservation to 
comply with judgments of the ECtHR. In 
that perspective, Swiss voters were offered 
a choice between the promise to re-establish 
direct democracy and self-government on 
the one hand and upholding both interna-
tional human rights law and economic glo-
balization on the other hand. Accustomed to 
such trade-offs at least since the rejection of 
the treaty on joining the European Economic 
Area in a popular vote on 6 December 1992, 
Swiss voters favored international human 
rights law and economic globalization over 
the promise of “taking back control” by a 
large margin: Two-thirds (66.2%) of the vot-
ers rejected the Self-determination Initiative. 
The proposal failed to prevail in any of the 
26 Cantons (states).
2. Constitutional Draft Amendments: From 
Privatizing Public Broadcasting Service to 
Subsidizing Horned Cows
As to the other seven constitutional draft 
amendments put to a popular vote in 2018, 
the voters on 4 March 2018 approved pro-
9 See BGE 125 II 417 para 4 (26 July 1999).
10 BGE 139 I 16 para 5 (12 October 2012).
11 See Reich, op. cit. 5, at 282.
12 Reich, op. cit. 5, at 283.
13 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????? ?? ???????????????979, 1024–25 (available at <www.ivr.uzh.ch/
????????
14 Art 121a, Clause 2, Fed Const.
15 See, e.g., Article 25, Clause 4, Agreement on Free Movement, op. cit. 2.
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longing the powers of the Federation to levy 
direct federal tax and VAT beyond 2020 until 
the year of 2035 by a large margin of over 
84%. On the same day, a popular initiative 
seeking to privatize public-service broad-
casting by rendering federal subsidies in fa-
vor of TV and radio stations unconstitution-
al was voted down by a ratio of 3 to 1. The 
“Sovereign Money Initiative”, aimed at lim-
iting money creation to Switzerland’s central 
bank and barring private banks from creating 
money, in particular through granting loans, 
met the same fate at the ballot box on 10 June 
2018. Three months later, on 23 September 
2018, the aforementioned tensions between 
self-governance and economic globalization 
again came to light, albeit merely limited to 
food and agriculture. The “Fair Food Initia-
tive” sought to limit food imports to agri-
cultural goods produced in compliance with 
high standards as to the environment, work-
ers’ rights, and animal welfare, whereas the 
“Food Sovereignty Initiative” aimed at lim-
iting food imports to boost eco-friendly do-
mestic production. Both constitutional draft 
amendments would have created tensions 
with obligations under international trade 
law. They were voted down by a margin of 
roughly 2 to 1. Contrary to these two popular 
initiatives, a constitutional draft amendment 
expanding the power of the Federation to en-
act “principles” with regard to bicycle paths 
????????????????????????????????????????????
was approved by three-quarters of the voters. 
Finally, a constitutional draft amendment 
put forward by the so-called “Horned Cow 
Initiative”, launched by a mountain farmer 
without any support of political parties or 
interest groups, called for federal subsidies 
to farmers refraining from dehorning their 
cows, bulls, and goats. The initiative gained 
considerable sympathy but was nonetheless 
rejected by 54.7% of the voters and 20 out of 
26 Cantons on 25 November 2018.
In sum, a mere two of the eight constitution-
al draft amendments put to a popular vote 
in 2018 were approved: one prolonging the 
powers of the Federation to levy direct fed-
eral tax and VAT, the other granting the Fed-
eration powers to enact guidelines in relation 
to bicycle paths. It is important to note that 
all of the popular initiatives put to a popular 
vote in 2018 were rejected. This underscores 
the low success rate of popular initiatives, 
currently standing at 10%, measured since 
the introduction of such initiatives at the 
federal level on 5 July 1891 until the end of 
2018. Both of the successful amendments in 
2018 were initiated by the Federal Govern-
ment and both expanded the powers of the 
Federation at the expense of the Cantons.
3. Failed Reversal of Court Rulings on the 
Constitutionality of Electoral Systems
Recent case law of the Federal Court consid-
erably limited the autonomy of the Cantons 
regarding the voting process applying to their 
parliamentary elections by committing them 
in principle to proportional representation.16
This case law mainly drew criticism due 
to the lack of any clear textual basis in the 
Federal Constitution restraining the choice 
to be made by the Cantons between elec-
toral systems. Two small Cantons brought a 
motion to the bicameral Federal Parliament, 
the Federal Assembly, seeking to reverse the 
relevant recent case law by way of a consti-
tutional amendment. The motion won the 
support of the Council of States, the equiv-
alent of the United States Senate, in which 
representatives of smaller Cantons are in a 
majority. The National Council, however, in 
which seats are allocated to the Cantons ac-
cording to their relative populations, failed 
to lend its support to the motion. The Federal 
Court’s case law on the matter thus remains 
in place.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Khalaf M Al-Dulimi v Federal De-
partment of Economic Affairs, Education 
and Research: Fair Trial and Targeted 
Sanctions by the U.N. Security Council17
Pursuant to Article 25 of the Charter of the 
United Nations (U.N. Charter), Switzerland 
is, like any other member of the United Na-
tions (U.N.), under an obligation to “carry 
out the decisions of the Security Council”. 
According to Article 103, U.N. Charter, 
obligations deriving from the U.N. Charter 
??????? ????????? ????? ??? ???????? ????? ????
other “obligations under any other interna-
tional agreement”. The ECHR, in its Article 
6, nonetheless commits Switzerland to pro-
vide for “a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and im-
partial tribunal established by law” in the 
determination of an individual’s “civil rights 
and obligations or of any criminal charge”.18
Targeted sanctions imposed by the U.N. Se-
curity Council against individuals without 
adequate due process therefore result in a 
dilemma for Switzerland of being caught 
???????? ??????????? ???????????? ?????? ??-
ternational law. A case brought by Youssef 
Mustapha Nada, at the time a resident of the 
Italian enclave of Campione, surrounded by 
the Swiss Canton of Ticino,19 ending with a 
decision by the ECtHR holding that Switzer-
land was in violation of its obligations under 
the ECHR,20 brought this dilemma to light 
??????????????????
The case of Khalaf M. Al-Dulimi offered no 
escape from this dilemma but added yet an-
other layer of complexity. Mr Dulimi was, 
according to the U.N. Security Council, the 
????? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ?????? ??????? ?????????
during the regime of Saddam Hussein. As a 
consequence and in accordance with the re-
spective U.N. Security Council Resolution 
16 Reich, op. cit. 5, at 281.
17 ?????????????????? ???????????????????????????? ????????????????????
18Johannes Reich, ‘Due Process and Sanctions Targeted Against Individuals Pursuant to Resolution 1267’ (1999), ????????????????????????????????? 33 (2008) S. 505-
511 (505-509).
19 See Reich, op. cit. n. 18 at 507-509.
20 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), ??????????????????? App no. 10593/089 (12 September 2012).
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1483 (2003) of 23 May 2003, the Swiss Fed-
eral State Secretariat for Economic Affairs 
(SECO), an administrative agency forming 
part of the Federal Department of Economic 
Affairs, Education and Research, froze both 
Mr Dulimi’s own assets and economic re-
sources in Switzerland and those of Montana 
Management, a company under his control, 
as they both directly or indirectly belonged 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
ernment. Mr Dulimi remained unsuccessful 
not only in his attempts to be heard (through 
the Swiss Federal Government) by the U.N. 
Security Council sanctions committee in 
order to have his name deleted from the 
blacklist but also with regard to challenging 
the asset freeze in Switzerland’s domestic 
courts. The Federal Court, in three decisions 
handed down on 23 January 2008, rejected 
Mr Dulimi’s appeals, holding that the word-
ing of the aforementioned Resolution 1483 
provided the Swiss federal administration 
with no leeway but to implement the sanc-
tions thereof in view of the aforementioned 
Article 103, U.N. Charter.21? ??? ????????
of Article 103, U.N. Charter, the ECtHR 
(Grand Chamber) undertook what it called 
a “harmonious interpretation”—or rather, as 
Judge Nussberger’s memorable dissent puts 
it, a “fake harmonious interpretation”—of 
Resolution 1483 in light of both the ECHR 
and the U.N. Charter in its judgment of 21 
June 2016.22 The Court held that Switzerland 
would have been entitled to a limited review 
of arbitrariness of sanctions imposed by the 
U.N. Security Council against Mr Dulimi in 
spite of the unambiguous wording in which 
Resolution 1483 spelled out Switzerland’s 
obligations. Switzerland, in the view of the 
Court, therefore violated Mr Dulimi’s right 
to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6, ECHR.
On appeal and in view of said decision by 
the ECtHR, the Swiss Federal Court, in a 
judgment dated 31 May 2018,23 repealed its 
own aforementioned decisions of 23 Janu-
ary 2008 and handed the case back to the 
SECO. It will be for the SECO to gath-
er all of the relevant information and as-
sess whether imposing targeted sanctions 
against Mr Dulimi either amounted to an 
apparently arbitrary decision or rather ap-
pears permissible weighing all of the rel-
evant factual and legal considerations in 
light of the limited review available to do-
mestic authorities according to the ECtHR’s 
harmonious interpretation approach.
The case of Al-Dulimi echoes the lessons of 
Nada:24 it is for the U.N. Security Council 
to provide for due process with regard to 
sanctions targeted against individuals. The 
persistent failure of the Security Council 
??????????????? ?????????? ??????????????????
Members, in particular to provide for ade-
quate due process not only seriously under-
mines the U.N.’s reputation as a champion 
of human rights but carries the risk of fur-
ther fragmenting the U.N. sanctions regime 
“along the borders of national and suprana-
tional jurisdictions”.25
2. A. and Others v Federal Office of Public 
Health: Children’s Rights and Public Aware-
ness Campaign Aimed at Preventing HIV 
and Other STDs26
More than 40 years ago, in 1987, the Feder-
??????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????
preventing the spread of the Human Immu-
???????????????????????????????????????-
??????????????????????????????????????-
tively. The campaign was soon extended to 
other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). 
From its very beginning, the messages were 
at the same time realistic, sober, and straight-
forward. The campaign advised the use of 
condoms, whereas moral suasion to abstain 
from a promiscuous lifestyle or to commit to 
marital faithfulness took a backseat. Rather 
unsurprisingly, the campaign faced political 
headwind at times, yet the substantial decline 
in new infections with HIV and other STDs, 
at least partly attributed to the well-known 
?????????? ????????? ???????????????????? ????
campaign was relaunched in 2014 with a 
lower budget, it was designed to maximize 
its impact. The hedonic slogan “Love Life” 
was accompanied not only by a picture of a 
condom but by intimate and rather explicit 
images of aesthetic nude heterosexual and 
homosexual couples. A casting was adver-
tised not for models but “normal couples” to 
feature on the posters and in the video clips 
of the campaign. In line with the laws of “at-
tention economy”, media outlets were all too 
willing to cover these events, claiming with 
feigned indignation that the FOPH would 
produce “pornographic material”. This cov-
erage multiplied the campaign’s message at 
no further cost to the taxpayer.
A. and others, a group of conservative Chris-
tian children (or rather their parents), howev-
er, strongly objected to the relaunched cam-
paign. Claiming that the campaign interfered 
with the constitutional provision according to 
which “children and young people have the 
right to particular protection of their integri-
ty and to care for their development” (Arti-
cle 11, Section 1, Fed Const), they formally 
petitioned the FOPH to immediately cancel 
the campaign. A. and others lodged an un-
successful appeal with the Swiss Federal Ad-
ministrative Court challenging the FOPH’s 
refusal. Thereinafter the case reached the 
Federal Court. The Court found no violation 
of the aforementioned constitutional pro-
vision, holding that the images used in the 
campaign failed to amount to “pornography” 
in the meaning of the Criminal Code. 
Narrowly framing the case, the Court left 
unaddressed the novel challenges raised by 
awareness campaigns by the public admin-
21 BGer, 2A.783/2006, 2A.784/2006, and 2A.785/2006 (all of 23 January 2008).
22 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Dulimi and Montana Management Inc v Switzerland, App no 5809/08 (21 June 2016).
23 BGE 144 I 214.
24 See Reich, op. cit. n. 18 at 510-11.
25 Reich, op. cit. n. 18 at 510.
26?????????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Warnungen und Empfehlungen zwischen Grundrechtsschutz, Kindeswohl und Aufmerksamkeitsökonomie’, in: Ruth Arnet et al. (eds), ???? ?????????? ?????????????????
????????????????????  (2019) 185-199.
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their message being indistinguishable from 
advertising campaigns in the private sector. 
Among these challenges is whether media 
coverage of an awareness campaign effec-
tively amounting to a “public-private part-
nership sui generis” does indeed fail to be 
attributable to the public administration even 
if the latter intentionally designed its com-
munication in a way to provoke such sensa-
tionalist media reports.27
3. Swiss Association of Public Servants v. 
Council of State of the Canton of Ticino: 
Trade Union Rights28
The Council of State of Ticino, the execu-
tive branch of the Canton of Ticino, took 
the decision to ban activities of trade unions 
from buildings occupied by the public ad-
?????????????? ?????? ?????? ????????? ?????
thus prevented from entering such prem-
ises when acting in their capacity as trade 
unionists. Meetings taking place in prem-
ises of the public administration between 
?????? ?????? ????????? ???? ??????? ?????????
would, according to the decision by the 
Council of State, be only permissible out-
side of working hours, subject to approval 
by the state chancellery, granted or rejected 
on a case-by-case basis. The Administrative 
Court of the Canton of Ticino dismissed an 
appeal launched by the Swiss Association 
of Public Servants, a labor union represent-
ing public servants, holding that the right 
granted to employees and employers alike 
to establish professional associations (Arti-
cle 28, Fed Const) would not grant the right 
for trade unions to enter premises occupied 
by the public administration. On appeal, 
the Federal Court acknowledged that the 
text of the Federal Constitution failed to 
provide any indication as to whether or not 
the right to enter buildings occupied by the 
public administration would form part of 
Article 28, Fed Const. Interpreted in light 
of international law, in particular Article 11, 
Section 1, ECHR and Conventions No. 87 
and 98 of the International Labor Organi-
zation, said provision of the Constitution 
would, according to the Court, indeed entail 
such a right. The Federal Court therefore 
dismissed the regulation by the Council of 
State of Ticino as being disproportional and 
therefore unconstitutional.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
On 20 October 2019, elections of the Federal 
Parliament will take place. At the beginning 
of the four-year term, elections of the Fed-
eral Council (executive branch) will be held 
in a joint session of the Federal Assembly 
in December 2019.29????????????????? ????-
es tend to remain relatively low in national 
?????????????????????????????????????????????
the Federal Council have virtually remained 
the same since 1959, the dilemma captured 
by the globalization paradox is most likely 
to form a recurrent theme in the election 
campaign of 2019, as Switzerland and the 
EU have been in negotiations with regard to 
an “institutional agreement” since 22 May 
2014. On 7 December 2018, the Federal 
Council took note of the outcome of said ne-
gotiations, refrained from initialing the draft 
of the respective “Agreement facilitating the 
bilateral relations between the EU and the 
Swiss Confederation with regard to the parts 
of the Internal Market in which Switzerland 
participates” (“Institutional Agreement”),30
and launched a consultation thereof to be 
reviewed in spring 2019. The institutional 
agreement between the EU and Switzerland 
seeks to provide a legal framework for ex-
isting and future market access agreements 
between the two in order to enhance their 
equal application. Yet, such stable and pre-
dictable economic globalization comes at 
a price. Switzerland would have to commit 
to a “dynamic adoption approach” allowing 
for the regular update of the market access 
agreements in line with the EU’s secondary 
legislation. Disputes between the parties 
would be referred to an arbitration panel. In 
all matters concerning the interpretation of 
EU law, said panel would have to request a 
ruling by the Court of Justice of the Europe-
an Union (CJEU) and would then resolve the 
????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ??????????????? ??? ????????? ??? ???????
with democratic self-determination from a 
Swiss perspective, the Council of the EU re-
iterated that any further development of the 
sectoral approach, such as the conclusion of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
services, would be conditional upon entering 
into an institutional agreement. Against this 
backdrop, the globalization paradox is likely 
???????????????????????????????????????????-
tutional law and politics in 2019 and beyond.
V. FURTHER READING
Swiss Political Science Review 24 (4) 
(2018), Special Issue: The 2015 Swiss Na-
tional Elections
Matthias Oesch, Switzerland and the Euro-
pean Union (2018)
27 Reich, op. cit. 26, at 196.
28 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
29 See Article 175, Section 2, Fed Const.
30 ‘Accord facilitant les relations bilatérales entre l’Union Européenne et la Confédération Suisse dans les parties du Marche Intérieur auxquelles la Suisse 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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The Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College is delighted to join, for the second 
year, I-CONnect in making this unique resource available to scholars and practitioners of constitutional law and policy 
around the world. The first - 2016 - edition of the Global Review of Constitutional Law, to which the Clough Center 
was a proud partner, received the outstanding reception it deserved as it quickly established itself as an indispensable 
resource for the world community. The 2017 edition, with its expanded number of jurisdictions, will undoubtedly 
solidify the reputation of the Global Review. 
The Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy aims to offer a platform that meets, in depth and scope, 
the urgency of the ongoing challenges to constitutional democracy. Each year, we welcome to Boston College some 
of the world’s leading jurists, historians, political scientists, philosophers and social theorists to participate in our 
programs and initiatives. The Center also welcomes visiting scholars from around the world, and I use this opportunity 
to encourage interested scholars to contact us. More information about the Center’s activities, including free access to 
the Clough Archive, is available at http://www.bc.edu/centers/cloughcenter.html.
The Clough Center is deeply grateful to all the contributors to this year’s Global Review, and to its editors. Particular 
thanks go to Professor Richard Albert, a trusted friend and partner of the Clough Center, for his vision and initiative 
in turning the Global Review into reality. 
A RENEWED PARTNERSHIP IN SUPPORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 
Vlad Perju
Director, Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy 
Professor, Boston College Law School 
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This year marks the third edition of the I·CONnect-Clough Center Global Review of Constitutional Law. First 
published in 2017 to review the constitutional law developments in the world in the year 2016, this edition reviews the 
constitutional law developments in the world in the year 2018.
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
?????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
and others, we hope to continue expanding our coverage of the world.
The purpose of the Global Review has remained unchanged since its founding. It is to offer readers systemic knowledge 
that has previously been limited mainly to local networks rather than a broader readership. By making this information 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
upon which scholars and judges can draw. Our ambition is to make our vast world smaller, more familiar, and more 
accessible.
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
the leadership team at the International Journal of Constitutional Law????????????????????????????? ??????????
Editors-in-Chief, as well as Sergio Verdugo, Associate Editor, for publishing a few contributions from this year’s 
Global Review focused on Latin America to coincide with the 2019 Annual Conference of the International Society of 
????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Chapter of the International Society of Public Law for hosting a regional workshop this past year for Global Review 
?????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
thanks as well to Gaurie Pandey at the Center for Centers at Boston College for her help once again in designing this 
beautiful volume.
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College. Professor Perju continues to inspire us with his vision for the 
Center, which he has transformed into a leading site in the world for discussion and debate on constitutionalism. A 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ??????? ??????????? ???????? ????? ???? ?????????????? ??? ???????? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ???????????????? ?????????? ???
express their interest in producing a report for next year’s Global Review. And, as always, we welcome feedback, 
recommendations, and questions from our readers. 
THE GLOBAL REVIEW TURNS THREE
Richard Albert and David Landau
Founding Co-Editors of I·CONnect and Co-Editors of the Global Review
Pietro Faraguna and Simon Drugda
Co-Editors of the Global Review
